One of the key benefits of using intrusion-tolerant systems is the possibility of ensuring correct behavior in the presence of attacks and intrusions. These security gains are directly dependent on the components exhibiting failure diversity. To what extent failure diversity is observed in practical deployment depends on how diverse are the components that constitute the system. In this paper, we present a study with operating system's (OS's) vulnerability data from the NIST National Vulnerability Database (NVD). We have analyzed the vulnerabilities of 11 different OSs over a period of 18 years, to check how many of these vulnerabilities occur in more than one OS. We found this number to be low for several combinations of OSs. Hence, although there are a few caveats on the use of NVD data to support definitive conclusions, our analysis shows that by selecting appropriate OSs, one can preclude (or reduce substantially) common vulnerabilities from occurring in the replicas of the intrusion-tolerant system.
INTRODUCTION
Many approaches are used by software developers and software system architects to minimize the risk of faults (bugs) or vulnerabilities ‡ remaining in the code after a product is delivered for operational use. Examples of these approaches vary from code verification and validation techniques to various forms of software testing. However, all these tasks are usually performed with limited budgets and time constraints. Even if we assume that software producers employ good software development and testing practices, the complexity of the software systems, often built with several layers of off-the-shelf (OTS) components, makes it very difficult to guarantee that (even modest) security requirements can be met. Given these constraints, software system architects succumb to the fact that systems will contain some faults and vulnerabilities even after release. Fault or intrusion tolerance techniques then remain an interesting choice to ensure that a sufficiently dependable (or secure) service is delivered to the clients despite failures. A system is said to be intrusion tolerant if it is able to remain functioning correctly even if some of its parts have their security compromised (for an overview of the area, see [1] ). A key building block of intrusion-tolerant systems is Byzantine fault-tolerant protocols, which guarantee correct behavior despite arbitrary faults, provided that a minority (usually less than one third [2] ) of components is system software, and applications); in Section 4.2, we present the results on the number of vulnerabilities that affect more than one OS; because we have analyzed the data over an 18-year period, we also looked at the evolution on the number of reported vulnerabilities for each OS family and present this analysis in Section 4.3. In Section 5, we present three strategies for selecting diverse OSs using the data we have on common vulnerabilities; in the same section, we also present some analysis of the potential benefits of diversity between releases of the same OS and consider the case where the system would be deployed with only two distinct OSs from the same family; in Section 6, we discuss the limitations we have found on NVD data and reason about the employment of diversity in replicated systems. Finally, in Section 7, we present conclusions and prevision for further work.
RELATED WORK

Research on diversity
Design diversity was introduced in 1975 as a mechanism for software fault tolerance [20] . Randell advocated using spare components whose design was independent from the main components, to cope with the circumstances that caused failures in the latter. N-version programming is a technique for creating diverse software components introduced also in those early years [3] . The main idea behind this mechanism is to use N different implementations ('versions') of the same component, programmed by N different teams, ideally using distinct languages and development methodologies. Versions run concurrently with the same input and form a consensus on the output from all versions to produce the final output. The objective is to achieve fault tolerance, assuming that designs and implementations developed independently will exhibit failure diversity. A later study by Knight and Leveson [21] showed that independently developed versions failed on the same demands with rates that were much higher than if statistical independence of failures between versions is assumed. Nevertheless, the data from the same study [21] showed that the number of coincident failures was relatively low and that diversity can bring benefits in reducing overall system failure rates, even if statistical independence of failure rates between different versions cannot be safely assumed a priori. Hatton [22] corroborates this work by comparing the failure probability of a single version and an N-version solution.
The seminal work on using diversity to improve security is due to Joseph and Avizienis [23] . They advocate using diverse compilers (produced with N-version programming) to detect and mask Trojaned compilers that infect the generated executables with viruses. Later, Forrest and colleagues applied notions from biologic systems to computer security and argued that diversity is an important natural mechanism to reduce the effects of attacks [24, 25] . They proposed randomized compilation techniques that automatically create diversity in applications, but only implemented a stack layout randomizer that is effective against buffer overflow attacks. Taxonomies of diversity techniques for improving security have been introduced in [26, 27] . In the early 2000s, a report by noted security experts [28] denouncing the risks of software monocultures and championing diversity as a means of improving security raised controversy in the security industry [29] . However, most of the cited studies lack empirical or statistical evaluation on the effectiveness of diversity.
Experimental evidence of the benefits of adopting diversity of SQL database servers is presented in [30] . The authors analyzed bug reports for four database servers (PostgreSQL, Interbase, Oracle, and Microsoft SQL Server) and verified which products were affected by each bug reported (the focus of their study is on overall dependability, not specifically on security). They found a few cases of a single bug affecting more than one server and that there were no coincident failures in more than two of the servers. Their conclusion is that diversity of OTS database servers is an effective means of improving system reliability. Some of the limitations of our dataset (see Section 6) prevent us from making the same type of study with NVD data.
Littlewood and colleagues [31] survey a number of issues in software diversity modeling, presenting models that have been developed for assessing the reliability of systems that adopt diversity. The models discussed in the survey aim to provide a measure of the reliability of a system as a function of the demands presented to the system and how these demands influence the correctness of the behavior of the system; these parameters are, for the most part, expressed as probability distributions. Some of these ideas have later been extended to the security domain as well [32] . They show that although failure independence cannot be claimed a priori when using diversity, diversity is nevertheless an effective means of increasing overall system reliability. They also discuss a number of caveats regarding software diversity modeling. It would be desirable to use these models in our context, but this is currently unfeasible, because we lack sufficiently detailed data (operational profiles and vulnerability exploitation rates) to apply them.
A study on diversity across software versions is presented in [33] . The authors propose a new discovery model that takes into account the software versions and therefore the importance of shared code on vulnerability discovery. They used several versions of Apache and MySQL, two open source server applications, to cross-validate their model. It was found that vulnerabilities continue to be discovered for older versions because of code that is shared with newer, more popular versions.
The need for diversity in modern BFT/Survivable/Intrusion-tolerant systems was also explicitly explored in some works. Castro et al. [7] proposed BASE, a BFT replication framework based on PBFT [6] , that uses OTS service components. This allows the utilization of different implementations to provide the same service, with the expectation of reducing the probability of common failures. Through the definition of the abstract state of the service being replicated, the authors claim that it is possible to hide the distinct implementations of the services, exploiting opportunistic N-version programming with OTS software. They present an implementation of a BFT network file system with replicas using different UNIX-based OS and file systems. A similar experiment with heterogeneous replication was done by Distler et al. using a different replication framework to replicate a RUBiS middleware architecture [34] . Although these works support the use of diverse OSs, they do not address the effectiveness of such approach in terms of dependability.
Roeder and Schneider [35] propose the use of proactive obfuscation, whereby each replica is periodically restarted using an automatically generated diverse executable, by the following: address reordering and stack padding, system call reordering, and instruction set randomization, heap and data randomization (e.g., a buffer overflow attack depends on stack layout, and therefore using entropy on the stack will likely crash the program instead of allowing an attacker to take control). The authors implemented two prototypes: (1) a distributed firewall based on packet filter in OpenBSD and (2) a distributed storage service. Proactive obfuscation employs semantics-preserving program transformations. This approach makes the replicas' service diverse, but does not help with OS diversity, and thus is complementary to our study.
Research on bugs and vulnerabilities in operating systems
Given the criticality of OSs, there are many papers that study the distribution of bugs and vulnerabilities in OS code. Miller et al. [36, 37] analyzed how commands and services in different UNIX variants dealt with random input and found out that between 25% and 50% of them (depending on the study) would crash or hang (seemingly enter an infinite loop). They identified cases where the same UNIX command would crash/hang in one OS but behave correctly in another one, as well as cases where both UNIX variants failed, but did not discuss whether occurrences of the latter could be attributed to the same bugs affecting different systems or not (some of the variants used in their studies derive from the same code base). A comparison of the robustness of 15 different POSIXbased OSs is presented in [38] . This study was based on fault injection: combinations of valid and invalid parameters were supplied to often-used system calls and C library functions, and the effects of this on reliability (e.g., system crash, process hang/crash, wrong or no error code returned, etc.) were observed. The authors found out some commonalities among the systems studied, especially with respect to the common mode failures of C library functions. However, from the available data, it is impossible to conclude whether there were specific bugs that affected more than one system (the paper only shows how many failures were observed for each system call in various degrees of severity, according to the effect produced for each failure). Still, their evidence indicates that from a reliability standpoint, using different OSs reduces the number of common failure modes.
Chou et al. [39] used compiler extensions to perform static analysis of the Linux and OpenBSD kernels; their study shows that device drivers exhibit more flaws than the rest of the kernel and that some types of bugs in the Linux kernel take an average of 1.8 years before being fixed. Ozment and Schechter [40] studied how OpenBSD security evolved over time, using data from OpenBSD security advisories and the project's source code repository to conclude that many vulnerabilities are still found in legacy code, that bugs in security-related code are more likely to be vulnerabilities, and that the rate of vulnerability reports for OpenBSD is decreasing over time. Anbalagan and Vouk [41] analyzed vulnerabilities in Bugzilla and Fedora Linux and found out that 34% of the vulnerabilities are exploited before being disclosed. None of these papers attempted to analyze the occurrence of common vulnerabilities across different OSs.
Research that has used NIST National Vulnerability Database data
Some vulnerability discovery models, which attempt to forecast the amount of vulnerabilities found in software, have been proposed [42] [43] [44] . Alhazmi and Malaiya [45] investigate how well these models fit with vulnerability data from the NVD and conclude that the vulnerability discovery process follows the same S-shaped curve of 'traditional' software reliability growth models [46] , which measure all defects found in a system (not only those that affect security). This conclusion is disputed in [47] , where it is claimed that the number of vulnerabilities disclosed in the NVD grows linearly with time (this contrast might be due to methodological differences). These studies cross-validate our idea of using the NVD as a source of vulnerability data; however, they are more concerned in modeling how many vulnerabilities are found in specific software over its lifetime [45] and if there are significant differences between open source and closed source software [47] , whereas our focus is on assessing the degree of diversity between different OSs. Ozment [16] points out some limitations of the NVD database, which we discuss further in Section 6.
Gorbenko and colleagues proposed using a diversity-aware configuration manager for deploying web services in a cloud [48] . The manager uses vulnerability information from sources such as NVD and Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) [49] to compute, in real time, vulnerability scores for the available software infrastructures, ¶ which are diverse. The infrastructure with the less vulnerable score is then chosen and, if necessary (it is different from the infrastructure currently deployed), redeployed by the manager. An analysis using OS vulnerability data for 2010 published in the NVD shows that switching the OS in response to new vulnerabilities reduces the number of days that a web service is at risk (the window of time between vulnerability disclosure and the release of a remedial patch). Although on the surface this analysis is similar to our study, there are some substantial differences. First, Gorbenko et al. do not consider replicated systems, they choose the best single configuration from a pool of diversified options; therefore, they are not explicitly concerned with common vulnerabilities, which is a major focus of our work. Second, the analysis considers only data from 2010, whereas our study is much more comprehensive, spanning 18 years (1994-2011) ; an analysis based on data from a single year may not be sufficient for obtaining sufficiently accurate estimates of the benefits of diversity.
Other related empirical security evaluations
A study by Ransbotham [50] assessed the risk of vulnerability exploitation in open source versus closed source software using log data from intrusion detection systems (IDSs) across 960 firms as evidence of exploitation and concluded that open source is more attacked than closed source, which was attributed to the availability of source code. However, not only IDS log data is noisy, potentially containing many false positives and missing false negatives, but also this kind of data is not usually available to the public (Ransbotham used anonymized customer data provided by a managed security services company).
Rajnovic [51] analyzed data from 2356 US-CERT Vulnerability Notes (VNs) published between 2000 and 2010 and found out that 21% of these 2356 vulnerabilities affected more than one vendor and that, on average, four vulnerabilities affecting multiple vendors were reported each month. His conclusion is that deploying diversity does not automatically ensure that there will be no common points of failure. It is important to note, however, that his analysis takes into consideration vendors, and not products, and is not restricted to OSs. As a consequence, it is possible that several vulnerabilities accounted for in his study affect applications or other components that have little impact on servers, which are the focus of our study. It should also be observed that the NVD database is much larger than the US-CERT vulnerability notes database (in the same time frame of Rajnovic's study, the NVD records 42,292 vulnerabilities, roughly 18 times the number of VNs), which might influence the statistical conclusions.
METHODOLOGY
This section presents the methodology adopted in our study, with particular focus on how the dataset (i.e., the vulnerabilities) was selected, processed, and analyzed.
Data source. We have analyzed OS vulnerability data from the NVD database [15] . NVD uses the CVE definition of vulnerability [52] , which is given as follows:
Definition 1 (CVE Vulnerability) An information security 'vulnerability' is a mistake in software that can be directly used by a hacker to gain access to a system or network. CVE considers a mistake a vulnerability if it allows an attacker to use it to violate a reasonable security policy for that system (this excludes entirely 'open' security policies in which all users are trusted or where there is no consideration of risk to the system). For CVE, a vulnerability is a state in a computing system (or set of systems) that either allows an attacker to execute commands as another user; allows an attacker to access data that is contrary to the specified access restrictions for that data; allows an attacker to pose as another entity; allows an attacker to conduct a denial of service.
NIST National Vulnerability Database aggregates vulnerability reports from more than 70 security companies, forums, advisory groups, and organizations, || thus being the most complete vulnerability database on the web. All data are made available as XML files containing the reported vulnerabilities on a given period, called data feeds. We analyze feeds from 2002 to 2011. ** Each NVD data feed contains a list of reported vulnerabilities sorted by its date of publication on a given period. For each vulnerability, called entry in the NVD parlance, interesting information is provided such as follows: a unique name for the entry, in the format CVE-YEAR-NUMBER; the list of products (with version numbers) affected by the vulnerability; the date of vulnerability publication; and the security attributes that are affected when the vulnerability is exploited on a system.
We developed a program that collects, parses, and inserts the XML data feeds into an SQL database, deployed with a custom schema to group vulnerabilities by affected products and versions.
Data selection. Despite the large amount of information about each vulnerability available in NVD, for the purposes of this study we are only interested in the name, publication date, summary (description), type of exploit (local or remote), and list of affected configurations. We have collected vulnerabilities reported for 64 Common Platform Enumerations (CPEs) [53] . Each one of these describes a system, that is, a stack of software/hardware components in which the vulnerability may be exploited. These CPEs were filtered, resulting in the following information that was stored in our database: Those 64 CPEs were, by manual analysis, clustered in 11 server-based OS distributions: OpenBSD, NetBSD, FreeBSD, OpenSolaris, Solaris, Debian, Ubuntu, Red Hat, † † Windows2000, Windows2003, and Windows2008. These distributions cover the most used server OS products of the BSD, Solaris, Linux, and Windows families (Mac OS X was not included because of its low popularity on the server market -see, for example, [54] ).
The schema of the resulting database is displayed in Figure 2 . The most important tables are as follows: cvss_* tables: refer directly to the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) metrics [55] of the stored vulnerabilities, which quantify the severity and impact of vulnerabilities; vulnerability: stores basic data about a vulnerability (name, publication date, etc.) from the NVD augmented with vulnerability life cycle information from the Open Source Vulnerability Database (OSVDB) [56] ; vulnerability_type: stores the vulnerability type assigned by us (see Section 4.1); os: stores the OSs platforms of interest in this study; os_vuln: stores the relationship between vulnerabilities and OSs, and their affected versions.
The use of an SQL database brings at least three benefits when compared with analyzing the data directly from the XML feeds. First, it allows us to enrich the dataset by hand, for example, by assigning, to each vulnerability, information regarding its type (see Section 4.1), and also by associating release times and family names to each affected OS distribution. Second, it allows us to modify the CVE fields to correct problems. For instance, one of the problems with NVD is that the same product is occasionally registered with distinct names in different entries; for example, (debian_linux, debian) and (linux, debian) are two (product, vendor) pairs we have found for the Debian Linux distribution. This same problem was previously observed by other users of NVD data feeds [57] . Finally, an SQL database is much more convenient to work with than parsing the feeds on demand.
Filtering the data
From the more than 44,000 vulnerabilities published by NVD at the time of this study, we selected 2563 vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities are the ones classified as OS-level vulnerabilities ('/o' in their CPE) for the OSs under consideration.
When manually inspecting the dataset, we discovered and removed vulnerabilities that contained tags in their descriptions such as Unknown and Unspecified. These correspond to vulnerabilities for which NVD does not know exactly where they occur or why they exist (however, they are usually included in the NVD database because they were mentioned in some patch released by a vendor). We also found few vulnerabilities flagged as **DISPUTED**, meaning that product vendors disagree with the vulnerability existence, and Duplicate, used for vulnerabilities in which the summary points to a duplicate entry or duplicate entry suspicion. Because of the uncertainty that surrounds these vulnerabilities, we decided to exclude them from the study as well. Table I shows the distribution of these vulnerabilities across the analyzed OSs, together with the total number of valid vulnerabilities.
An important observation about Table I is that the columns do not add up to the number of distinct vulnerabilities (last row of the table) because some vulnerabilities are shared among OSs and are counted only once. Notice that about 60% of the removed vulnerabilities affected Solaris and OpenSolaris. Moreover, these two systems are the only ones that have more than 10% of its vulnerabilities removed. We should remark that this manual filtering was necessary to increase the confidence that only valid vulnerabilities were used in the study.
OPERATING SYSTEM DIVERSITY STUDY
This section describes the results of the study. It provides an overall analysis of the counts of vulnerabilities in each OS component class, presents vulnerabilities that are common to OS pairs, and shows the evolution of shared OS vulnerabilities over time. The section also gives empirical evidence to demonstrate that there are security gains in using diverse OSs in a replicated system.
Vulnerability distribution by OS component
Nowadays, when users acquire or download an OS, they get a kernel implementing the fundamental OS functionality but also a number of other software components. After the initial installation, users may reconfigure the machine to their needs, for instance, by removing application packages that are unnecessary and/or by including device drivers to support new hardware. This customization is also advisable from a security standpoint, with a few different baseline OS installations created for machines with distinct roles within an organization. For example, a network server OS installation should be stripped of most applications to minimize the attack surface and reduce the risk of intrusion. Therefore, besides understanding how vulnerabilities affect the various OS products, it is also important to know what parts of these systems are compromised by the vulnerabilities. In NVD, an OS product is composed by the kernel, device drivers, optional modules, system software, and applications. Because NVD does not have a specific field identifying the affected component except for the vulnerability description, we inspected the entries manually and classified each vulnerability in one of four categories: Driver, Kernel, System Software, and Application. The classification criteria are the following:
Kernel: vulnerabilities in the TCP/IP stack (and other network protocols implemented in the OS), file system, process and task management, core libraries and modules related to the CPU architecture; Driver: vulnerabilities in drivers for the devices that might be connected to the machine (e.g., wireless/wired network cards, video/graphic cards, web cams, audio cards, plug and play devices); System software: vulnerabilities in software providing common OS functionalities such as login, shells and basic daemons (e.g., DNS, telnet, lpd). In this class, we only account for software that comes by default with the distribution (although sometimes it is possible to uninstall these components without affecting the main OS operation); Application: vulnerabilities in software that comes with the OS but that is not needed for basic operation and in some cases requires specific installation. For example, database management systems, messaging clients, text editors and processors, web/email/FTP clients and servers, music/video players, programming languages (compilers and virtual machines), security packages (antivirus and authentication solutions), and games. Table II summarizes the result of the analysis of the 2270 vulnerability descriptions, which were then assigned to one of the OS component classes. The table shows that with the exception of Drivers, all OS products have a reasonable number of vulnerabilities in each class. Therefore, this confirms the intuition that there are security gains if certain software components can be removed from the OS distributions. In the BSD and Solaris families, vulnerabilities appear in high numbers in the Kernel part, whereas in the Linux and Windows families, the Applications vulnerabilities are more prevalent. This can be explained by noticing that Windows and Linux default distributions usually contain more pre-installed applications when compared to BSD/Solaris. Therefore, the number of Applications vulnerabilities in Windows and Linux have higher reported values -there is the expectation that users will not install most of the applications missing from the default distributions, and thus, their vulnerabilities not appear in the OS statistics.
The last row of the table presents the percentage of each class on the total dataset. One can observe that most vulnerabilities occur in the Application and Kernel components, which is then followed by the System Software group of utility programs. It is interesting to notice that Drivers have a very small percentage of the published OS vulnerabilities. This result is somewhat surprising because device drivers account for a large fraction of OS code [39] , and because they are typically hard to develop, one would expect that they would contain a large number of programming flaws. In fact, previous studies have demonstrated that drivers are the major cause for crashes in certain OSs [58] . One, however, should keep in mind that software bugs do not necessarily translate into security vulnerabilities, which are the kind of flaw reported in the NVD. To become vulnerabilities, the adversary has to be able to force the conditions to activate the bugs, which for device drivers can be extremely difficult because they are related to specific low-level aspects of the system.
Common vulnerabilities
This section analyzes the vulnerabilities that were shared in OS pairs over the period of 1994 to 2011. In the investigation, we consider three possible server machine setups offering an increasingly more secure platform. This accommodates the case where system administrators create differentiated OS installations, which contain more or less vulnerabilities depending on the services and applications available in the server. Of course, other setups could be used, but we decided to concentrate on these configurations because they are quite generic and they lead to results that can be directly obtained from the NVD data. The setups are the following:
Fat server: The server contains most of the software packages for a given OS, and consequently, it can be used to run various kinds of applications by locally or remotely connected users. This server has potentially all vulnerabilities that were reported for the corresponding OS; Thin Server: This setting corresponds to a platform that does not contain any applications (with the exception of the replicated service). The server has a decreased security risk because the attack vectors related to applications have been mostly eliminated. In this setting, vulnerabilities classified as Applications are excluded from the statistics (see Section 4.1); Isolated Thin Server: The server is configured similarly to the Thin Server but is placed in a room physically protected from illegal accesses, with remote logins disabled, and therefore, it can only be compromised by receiving malicious packets from the network. In this setting, we only consider remotely exploitable vulnerabilities (those with 'Network' or 'Adjacent Network' values in their CVSS_ACCESS_VECTOR field) that are not classified as Applications.
The Fat Server setup corresponds to a case where any application available in the OS distribution may be targeted by attack. Therefore, it provides an upper bound estimate on the number of vulnerabilities that can be exploited. The Thin Server setups (Isolated or not) are the counterpart case, where the system is deployed without applications that come bundled with the OS and thus provide a lower bound estimate on the number of common vulnerabilities. The Isolated Thin Server, in particular, only has the vulnerabilities that can be remotely exploited. Of course, in practice, at least one application (such as a name service or a distributed file service) would be deployed in an intrusion-tolerant system, and the vulnerabilities of this application would add up to the flaws that we will report. In any case, because we expect that most of the complexity is in the OS, we anticipate that a single application will have a small contribution to the overall number of vulnerabilities. Table III shows the vulnerabilities that were found in common for every combination of OS pair. In all cases, the number of shared vulnerabilities between two OSs is substantially reduced when compared with the overall set of vulnerabilities. Even considering a Fat Server configuration, it is possible to find out OS pairs that do not have common flaws (e.g., NetBSD-Ubuntu) and OS families that share very few vulnerabilities (e.g., BSD and Windows). As expected, OSs from the same family have more common vulnerabilities because of the software components and applications that are reused (e.g., Debian-Red Hat or Windows2000-Windows2003). The Thin Server when compared with the Fat Server shows improvements in several OS pairs, but often, there are still a few shared flaws. In contrast, the use of an Isolated Thin Server has a much stronger impact on security because it substantially diminishes the number of common vulnerabilities -the number of pairs with zero vulnerabilities goes from 11 to 21. Overall, this means that a significant portion of common vulnerabilities are local (i.e., cannot be exploited remotely) and/or come from applications that are available in both OSs. Table IV shows which parts of the OS are affected by common vulnerabilities in an Isolated Thin Server configuration, considering only the OS pairs with nonzero common vulnerabilities. The fact that there are many shared Kernel and System Software vulnerabilities between Windows2000 and Windows2003 indicates that the latter inherits considerable parts of the OS from its predecessor. This same trend is also observed between Windows2008 and Windows2003/Windows2000, although to a less extent. Interestingly, no single vulnerable driver is present in all products, which can be explained by the very few faulty drivers that are reported. The second OS family with more common vulnerabilities is BSD, which also reuses several OS components. Here, a few vulnerabilities were found in device drivers that appear in more than one OS pair. A somewhat surprising result is the fact that most Linux distributions have much less shared flaws than we anticipated. We inspected the vulnerabilities manually to find an explanation, and we discovered that Linux distributions customize both their kernel and system software, and thus, the vulnerabilities are less common. Another interesting point about OSs from the Linux family is that they have an almost negligible number of driver vulnerabilities (see Table II ), and none of them appears in more than one OS.
OpenSolaris is an open source OS based on Solaris that was released in 2008, and until this moment, the two OSs only share a small number of vulnerabilities.
Intrusion-tolerant systems are usually built using four or more replicated servers. Therefore, it is useful to understand if there are many vulnerabilities that involve groups of OSs larger than two -if this is the case, then it will be hard to find OS configurations for the various servers that do not share vulnerabilities, and a goal of using OTS diversity will be difficult to be achieved in practice. Figure 3 portrays the number of common vulnerabilities that exist simultaneously in increasingly larger sets of OSs (with Isolated Thin Servers). The graph shows a rapid decrease of the shared vulnerabilities as the number of OSs grows. The largest group that was affected by the same vulnerability had six OSs, and this occurred only for a single flaw, and there were also two vulnerabilities in sets with five OSs. Vulnerabilities in two and three OSs normally occur in systems from the same family, whose common ancestry implies the reuse of larger portions of the code base. As we have seen in previous tables, this is particularly true for the Windows and BSD families. Table V lists in more detail the vulnerabilities that can be exploited in larger groups (four to six) of OSs. The first three bugs have a considerable impact because they allow a remote adversary to run arbitrary commands on the local system using a high-privilege account. They occurred either in widespread login services (telnet and rlogin) or in a basic system function, and consequently, several products from the BSD family were affected, as well as Solaris. The NVD entry for the CVE-2001-0554 vulnerability also had external references to the Debian and Red Hat websites, which could indicate that these systems might suffer from a similar (or the same) problem. Vulnerability CVE-2008-1447 occurs in a large number of systems because it results from a bug in the BIND implementation of the Domain Name System (DNS). Because BIND is a highly popular service, more OSs could potentially be affected. A closer look at the corresponding NVD entry reveals external references to the sites of OpenBSD, NetBSD, and FreeBSD, indicating that they would be vulnerable in case this software was being used. This sort of vulnerability confirms that from an intrusion-tolerance perspective it is unwise to run the same server software everywhere and that diverse implementations must be selected (in this case, for recursive DNS servers). The remaining three vulnerabilities are related to the TCP/IP protocol stack. All of them affect system availability, allowing different forms of denial of service (DoS) attacks. CVE-2008-4609 is the vulnerability that affects more OSs, according to the NVD database. Given that TCP/IP stack code is often reused across OSs, we checked the web sites of the other OSs for reports related to this vulnerability. We only found a disclaimer by Red Hat [59] stating that this flaw affected some releases but that they would not provide an update (they only offered a mitigation solution based on IPtables, the Linux firewall software).
Overall, the aforementioned results look encouraging because over a large period (around 18 years), there are very few vulnerabilities that appear in many OSs. A good portion of them are in the TCP/IP stack implementation, which is probably the most shared software component across OSs, but they only impact on the availability of the system, leaving confidentiality and integrity of data unharmed. [60] , and the future of OpenSolaris became uncertain with the acquisition of Sun by Oracle [61] .
Evolution of common vulnerabilities over time
The way vulnerabilities evolved over the 12-year period allows the following observations. First, it is possible to notice a reasonable correlation among the peaks and valleys of both the Windows and Linux families and, to a lesser extent, in the BSD family. This supports the idea that some vulnerabilities are shared across the family members, as seen in the previous section. Second, some OS families have less vulnerabilities being reported in recent years (2009-2011) than in the more distant past. This is true for both the BSD and Linux, which could indicate that the systems are becoming more stable, but also that the development processes being employed impose stronger requirements on software quality. Finally, it is also useful to compare the vulnerability dates and the year of the first OS release. NVD classifies vulnerabilities when they are first discovered and then lists the OSs that might be compromised by their exploitation. Therefore, it is possible to find for example in OpenSolaris one entry earlier than the official release date of 2008, a vulnerability shared with Solaris (a locally exploitable bug -CVE-2007-5365). This confirms that OpenSolaris inherits some of the code of Solaris, and consequently, it is influenced by existing flaws. The same type of problem was also observed with Windows 2000 with regard to vulnerabilities in common with Windows NT. ‡ ‡ Table VI displays the number of common vulnerabilities per year in OS pairs in a Fat Server setting. We have excluded OpenSolaris from this analysis because data are missing for several years over the period. The table displays a significant number of OS pairs with zero common vulnerabilities in many years (45% of the nonempty cells have zeros). This is particularly visible for OSs belonging to different families, such as between Debian and Solaris, or Debian and Windows2008. Years with zero entries even appear for pairs with very high vulnerability counts, as bugs sometimes relevant vulnerabilities are significantly reduced (see Table III ). Here, the percentage of zero cells is even higher, reaching the value of 63%. The last rows of the table display the mean, standard deviation, and maximum number of vulnerabilities for each year. The mean value increases in the most recent years, implying that more shared vulnerabilities are being reported on average. This however should not be understood as an overall Copyright decrease in diversity across systems. As the standard deviation demonstrates, there are a few OSs with a very high number of common flaws (the Windows family), whereas for the rest, the number of common vulnerabilities is decreasing. In fact, if the influence of Windows2008 is removed from the table, the mean number of common vulnerabilities has been reduced in the last 3 years. From the point of view of deploying intrusion-tolerant systems, the results of this section show that there are several OS pairs with a few to none shared vulnerabilities over reasonable time intervals (a couple of years). Moreover, in certain cases, these vulnerabilities seem to be decreasing as systems mature. Consequently, it should be feasible to select configurations of four or more OSs that with high probability are very resilient to intrusions.
STRATEGIES FOR OPERATING SYSTEM DIVERSITY SELECTION
This section presents three alternative strategies to deploy diverse OSs on replicated systems, to decrease the chance of common vulnerabilities. We start the section by first describing an approach we called the Common Vulnerability Indicator (CVI), which is used by one of the strategies. For each strategy, we then give example sets of OSs that exhibit a good level of diversity and perform an evaluation based on the collected data. Finally, we conclude the section with an analysis of potential diversity between releases of the same OSs (concentrating on the OSs that the three strategies picked as the best configuration).
Common vulnerability indicator
We already saw in the previous section that the number of common vulnerabilities that are observed between different OSs varies over time. To be able to evaluate which OS pairs are more (or less) likely to experience common flaws while taking into account the timing of vulnerability disclosures, we developed a new metric, called the Common Vulnerability Indicator (CVI). This indicator is calculated for a given year y, on the basis of the vulnerabilities that were shared by OSs A and B over a period of tspan previous years. CVI is built to ensure the following desirable properties: Therefore, CVI is useful for comparison purposes, allowing the identification of OS pairs that have a smaller number of common flaws, while taking into consideration the instant when vulnerabilities were found. This last point is particularly important because OSs are constantly evolving, potentially getting more (or less) diverse, and consequently, one should take into consideration the time dimension when selecting OS configurations (e.g., OS pairs that have had less common flaws recently are likely better candidates). CVI is computed as follows:
First, a weighting factor˛i is defined for each year i 2 ¹y tspan C 1, : : : , y 2, y 1, yº,
CVI is then obtained using the number of vulnerabilities v i .A, B/ that appeared in both OSs A and B for every year i from the start of the time span up to reference year y, Table VII presents CVI values for the years 2009 to 2011. We have excluded from this analysis OSs with vulnerability information missing for more than 1 year over the period, to avoid using incomplete data in the calculation of the indicators. Therefore, the following OSs were not considered in Table VII : Windows2003, Windows2008, Ubuntu, and OpenSolaris. The CVI values are computed for a tspan of 10 years to reflect a reasonable history. It is possible to see that with the exception of one system (Solaris with FreeBSD/Red Hat/Windows2000 in the Fat Server), in all remaining cases, CVI shows a decreasing trend. Several of the OSs that have evolved over a large period are having less reported vulnerabilities, and this causes a decline in shared vulnerabilities in the recent years. For some of the OS pairs, the drop in the CVI value is quite significant, becoming almost one third of the 2009 value (NetBSD with Debian or Red Hat). In the Isolated Thin Server case, there are three pairs with CVI.A, B/ D 0, which shows that they have shared no vulnerabilities during the past 12 years and are thus particularly good candidates to include in intrusion-tolerant configurations. These systems are Debian with either OpenBSD or FreeBSD or Solaris.
An example of the usefulness of CVI can be seen, for example, when comparing OpenBSD-Red Hat with Solaris-Red Hat. According to Table VI, both OS pairs had 10 common vulnerabilities in the 2000-2011 period, suggesting that they both provide the same degree of diversity. However, from the CVI values in Table VII , it is apparent that OpenBSD and Red Hat have become more diverse, in recent years, than Red Hat and Solaris, making it advisable, from a diversity standpoint, to choose the former OS pair over the latter.
Building replicated systems with diversity
This section describes three strategies for choosing diverse sets of OSs. These strategies utilize the data analyzed earlier as a basis to make decisions, by assuming that the information reported by NVD on vulnerabilities can be correlated to the amount of diversity among OSs. Of course, there are some caveats associated with this approach, which we discuss in Section 6.1, but the alternatives can be even harder to put in practice, especially if one wants to consider a large number of OSs. For example, for closed systems (e.g., Windows), it is very difficult to actually determine the level of sharing of OS components, and therefore, diversity estimations based on the code cannot be performed. Moreover, even if this estimate could be obtained, there is the risk that it does not reflect the number of vulnerabilities that occur simultaneously in several OSs (e.g., two distinct implementations of the same flawed algorithm are vulnerable).
The first strategy, called Common Vulnerability Count Strategy (CVCst), is based on raw data collected over a large interval and is the simplest approach for selecting OS pairs. It should be used when one wants to treat all vulnerabilities, regardless of the time that were reported, as equally important to make choices. The second strategy, Common Vulnerability Indicator Strategy (CVIst), uses the CVI described in the previous section to select OS pairs taking into account the incidence of common vulnerabilities over the years. It is indicated when one wants to give greater importance to more recent vulnerabilities, because it is a weighted sum. The third strategy, Inter-reporting Times Strategy (IRTst), follows a different approach from the previous ones, focusing not so much on common vulnerabilities directly, but on the frequency in which vulnerabilities appear in the two OSs. If one wants to give more importance to the time interval between successive reports of common vulnerabilities, this is the best strategy. Because this last criterion complements the previous two, one could explore strategies CVCst and CVIst in conjunction with IRTst.
For every strategy, we present example OS sets for the Fat Server and Isolated Thin Server configurations. Fat Server configurations can be pessimistic in the sense that they may account for common vulnerabilities in applications that are not present in the servers, whereas Isolated Thin Server configurations reflect more accurately the expected setup of dedicated servers in a replicated system. An intrusion-tolerant system usually requires 3f C 1 replicas to tolerate f intrusions (e.g., [1, 5, 6, 12] ). Therefore, we will focus on sets with four OSs to deploy a hypothetical replicated system with four replicas, which allows one fault to be tolerated.
As a cautious note, one should take into account that Ubuntu and Windows2008 were first released in 2004 and 2008, respectively, so the data for these two OSs was collected for a smaller number of years. Windows2000 is presented in the tables because there are published vulnerabilities until 2010, although it has been gradually replaced by Windows2003 and Windows2008 in the organizations. Consequently, we do not use Windows2000 when choosing the OS sets. We have excluded OpenSolaris from the study because there is data available for only a limited period. In each strategy and configuration, we present two sets: setCon is more conservative, because it does not contain Ubuntu and Windows2008; and setUpdt is more up to date because it can include Ubuntu and Windows2008. When looking at these two sets, one should keep in mind that setCon is selected from a group of OSs for which there is a large amount of NVD data, which contributes for a higher confidence on the result. On the other hand, setUpdt uses OSs with different amounts of NVD data, which can cause small levels of inaccuracy when making comparisons (e.g., in the CVCst, any OS pair featuring Windows2008 has zero common vulnerabilities until 2007). One way to address this would be to only consider vulnerabilities that appear later than 2007 when choosing setUpdt. We opted not to follow this approach because it has the drawback of discarding too much data.
Common vulnerability count (CVCst).
The results from the previous section give a strong indication that it should be possible to choose groups of OSs with few common vulnerabilities over reasonable intervals of time. However, we would like to understand if the data from the NVD database are effective at suggesting these groups of OSs. To address this point, we divided the data in two subsets: the history period, comprising the data for the interval 2000 to 2009, and the observed period, from 2010 to 2011. The objective is to employ the history period to pick the sets of OSs to use on the replicated system (as if the choice was made at the beginning of 2010) and then use the data for the observed period to verify if these choices would have been adequate, that is, if they have a small (preferably the smallest) number of common vulnerabilities in this period.
CVCst makes decisions directly on the basis of the empirical data for the number of common vulnerabilities across all OS pairs. These data are displayed in Table VIII for OSs with a Fat Server configuration. Numbers to the right and above the diagonal line represent the history period, whereas numbers to the left and below the line stand for the observed period. For example, the entry corresponding to OpenBSD-Red Hat to the right of the diagonal line has the number 10, which means that these OSs shared 10 vulnerabilities between 2000 and 2009. The equivalent entry, but to the left of the diagonal line, is 0 because they had no common flaws reported in 2010 and 2011. As expected, OS pairs from the same family had the highest counts of common vulnerabilities. The only case where there were more vulnerabilities in the observed period than the history period is for the Windows2008-Windows2003 pair, which is explained by the recent release date of Windows2008. It is interesting to notice, however, that most pairs had zero common vulnerabilities in the observed period.
The strategy for building sets of OSs is based on a simple cost function. Given any potential OS pair A and B that could be added to the set, one can perform a lookup in Table VIII to determine the pair's number of common vulnerabilities in the history period. This number corresponds to the cost of adding this OS pair to the group. Similarly, when including a third OS C, it is possible to find in the table the entries for A-C and B-C and take their sum as the cost of integrating C in the group. When building a set with n OSs, the total cost is the addition of each individual cost for all combinations of OS pairs. The sets that lead to smaller values of total cost are considered the best choices for deployment in the replicated system. Accordingly, on the basis of the table, the best groups of four OSs are as follows: setCon D {OpenBSD, Solaris, Debian, Windows2003}, with a total cost of 23; setUpdt D {NetBSD, Solaris, Ubuntu, Windows2008}, with a total cost of 12.
One however should keep in mind that sometimes the total cost may be only an approximation of the actual number of shared vulnerabilities among the OSs in the set, as certain vulnerabilities might be counted more than once. This will likely not be a problem, because overcounting vulnerabilities provides a conservative estimate, or an estimate worse than reality. For example, setUpdt only has 11 shared vulnerabilities for a total cost of 12, because one of the vulnerabilities appears in three of the OSs (and is therefore included in two table entries).
Next, we can check to what extent our choice of the best group of four OSs that we would pick from the history period (2000-2009), as prescribed by CVC cost calculation, remains consistent with the choice of best group of four OSs from the observed period (2010-2011). We see that both setCon and setUpdt have only two shared vulnerabilities. They are not the best sets in the observed period (2010-2011), because there are groups of OSs with zero common vulnerabilities in the observed period (e.g., by replacing Solaris with Red Hat), although they do exhibit a high level of diversity. A graphical representation of the sets as Venn diagrams is available in Figure 5(a,b) . Below the OS name is the total number of vulnerabilities during the observed period, and the number inside each Copyright intersection shows the count of common flaws for the corresponding OSs. For example, in setCon with Fat Servers (Figure 5(a) ), there is one vulnerability that appears both on Solaris and OpenBSD and another on Solaris and Windows2003.
Table IX presents the common vulnerabilities with the Isolated Thin Server configuration data. This configuration represents a class of servers that have a dedicated function and are protected against physical intruders. The same approach can be applied as mentioned previously: first, we choose the best pairs on the basis of the history period to build a set of four OSs; next, we evaluate the sets by comparing the results with the values for the observed period. The history period provides two candidate sets: setCon D {NetBSD, Solaris, Debian, Windows2003}, with a total cost of 9; setUpdt D {Solaris, Debian, Ubuntu, Windows2008}, with a total cost of 2.
In the observed period, setCon and setUpdt have no common vulnerabilities, showing that the strategy would have chosen sufficiently diverse groups of OSs. A graphical representation of the sets is displayed in Figure 5(c,d) .
Common vulnerability indicator strategy (CVIst).
This strategy employs the CVI value, defined at the beginning of this section, to make decisions about including/excluding particular OSs. Therefore, besides taking advantage of the available data on total counts of shared vulnerabilities, it also uses the information on how these numbers have evolved through the years.
CVIst is applied by executing the following method, which is based on minimizing a cost function. For a given year and time span, the CVI value is calculated for each of the OS pairs. Typically, one should use the most recent year for which there is available data. The time span should cover a reasonable interval, so that the indicator reflects the trend on discovered vulnerabilities. In some cases, however, one may have to resort to smaller time spans due to lack of data, namely with OSs released recently. In this case, the indicator will give a higher weight to the vulnerabilities reported in the last year. In CVIst, the cost of creating a group with two OSs A and B is CVI.A, B/. Extending this idea to a group of n OSs, the total cost becomes the sum of the individual CVIs for all combinations of OS pairs. To choose the best groups, the strategy searches for sets of OSs that together have the smallest total cost.
To evaluate this strategy, we split the time in two intervals as we did for CVCst. Table X To verify if CVI is a good indicator for selecting diverse sets, we can look at the number of common vulnerabilities in the observed period (2010-2011). By analyzing Table X, it is possible to see that setCon and setUpdt remain good sets, each one with two shared flaws. As before with CVCst, one can find better sets in observed period, where no vulnerabilities appear in common, for example, by replacing Solaris with Red Hat. The Venn diagrams for these two sets are shown in Figures 5(e,f) . Table XI By checking the data for the observed period, one can see that both sets do not share a single vulnerability, which indicates that the strategy would have made a good selection of OSs (see also the Venn diagrams in Figure 5(g,h) .
Inter-reporting times strategy (IRTst).
This strategy is mainly concerned with the InterReporting Times (IRT) , that is, the number of days between successive reports of common vulnerabilities in different OS pairs, rather than vulnerability counts. The assumption underlying this strategy is that lower inter-reporting times suggest greater similarity between OSs, and thus, it would be advisable, from a diversity standpoint, to select OSs with higher IRTs.
Table XII presents the number of vulnerabilities for each pair of OSs in five IRT intervals, from 0 to 10,000 days. The values in the table were obtained in the following manner: first, for a given OS pair A and B, we collected the dates for common vulnerabilities; next, we calculated the IRT in days of every two consecutive vulnerabilities; then, we counted the number of vulnerabilities that were within each interval. The table is organized such that on the top are the OSs without common vulnerabilities, which are then followed by the ones that had larger IRT values. Therefore, each horizontal line separates groups of OS pairs that have positive IRT values in the same leftmost column, starting from the rightmost column (i.e., with the longer IRTs). From a diversity perspective, it is interesting to notice that in the table, there are 29% of the pairs that do not have two consecutive vulnerabilities and that 11% only have consecutive vulnerabilities from 1000 days on (last column).
The IRTst strategy allows the selection of OSs with longer IRTs. This criteria is important if one wants to deploy a system that has a short lifetime, for example, a batching process, which ideally would only be in operation between the discovery of common vulnerabilities. IRTst tries first to select OS pair with zero common vulnerabilities; when this is not possible, it chooses next pair whose common vulnerabilities appear in the rightmost columns. By inspecting the table, we can see that the best two sets of four OSs are as follows:
Table XIII presents the IRTs for an Isolated Thin Server configuration. Because each OS pair has less common vulnerabilities, this translates often in larger IRTs. The percentage of lines with zero IRTs in all intervals is higher, 51%, but remained the same for the OS pairs that share vulnerabilities with longer IRTs (11%). When applying the strategy to this table, the best sets of OSs are as follows: Table XII of experiencing common vulnerabilities in the future. Therefore, if there is a small collection of OS sets with this property, then all strategies should elect one of these sets as the best choice. This is exactly what we observed with the NVD data, and consequently, the selected best sets are not too different from each other. Only when one needs to find many OS sets with good levels of diversity, such as with the implementation of proactive recovery mechanisms in intrusion-tolerant systems [6, 62] , then the distinctions among the strategies start to become apparent. We leave it as future work a more refined study on the comparison of the strategies with larger groups of OS sets. The OS sets that resulted from the execution of the strategies achieved good levels of diversity when evaluated in the observed period (years 2010 and 2011). As expected from our analysis in Table XIII Section 4, several of the best sets contained an OS from each of the families. The exception to this rule occurred with the Linux family, where in a few cases it had two representatives (Debian and Ubuntu) because these OSs had very few vulnerabilities reported in the last 3 years. Even though the BSD family also had a small number of recent vulnerabilities, because these occasionally affected more OSs, the strategies opted for including just one of the BSD OSs.
In the next section, we will look into OS versions as a way to increase diversity. For this study, we will use the set that was most selected by the different strategies: {OpenBSD, Debian, Solaris, Windows2003} (4 out of 12 choices, considering both Fat Server and Isolated Thin Server configurations).
Exploring diversity across operating system releases
If one wants to build systems capable of tolerating a few intrusions, our results show that it is possible to select OSs for the replicas with a small collection of common vulnerabilities. It is hard, however, to support critical services that need to remain correct with higher numbers of compromised replicas or to use some Byzantine fault-tolerant algorithms that trade off performance for extra replicas (e.g., [4, 11, 63] ). The number of available OSs is limited, and consequently, one rapidly runs out of different OSs (e.g., 13 distinct OSs are needed to tolerate f D 4 faults in a 3f C 1 system). On the other hand, our experiments are relatively pessimistic in the sense that they are based on long periods and no distinctions are made between OS releases.
Newer releases of an OS can contain important code changes, and therefore, old vulnerabilities may disappear and/or new vulnerabilities may be introduced. As a result, if we consider (OS, release) pairs, one may augment the number of different systems that do not share vulnerabilities. Nevertheless, one should keep in mind that the use of older OS releases does not come without a cost; namely, there might be incompatibilities with the current hardware, and some older software packages might be difficult to find.
In the next two sections, we explore n-diverse sets, where we extend the OS, as an element in the set, to the OS release. First, we study a 4-diverse set and then a 2-diverse set built with only two OSs. We will concentrate on Isolated Thin Server configurations because they correspond to the most common way to deploy intrusion-tolerant systems.
4-diverse sets.
Here we analyze in more detail the vulnerabilities for the set {OpenBSD, Debian, Solaris, Windows2003} across their releases between 2000 and 2011. Despite the year of the release, because some vulnerabilities can be inherited from older versions of the code, we will include all vulnerabilities no matter the published date (i.e., even the flaws prior to 2000).
From all releases available for our 4-version replicated system, ¶ ¶ we looked at the major releases that had nonzero vulnerabilities. Because OpenBSD follows a fixed 6-month release cycle, in this case, we selected one version every 3 years, which is reasonable given our 12-year time span (taking all 18 releases into consideration would require 154 entries in the table). Therefore, the OS releases that are taken into the study are as follows: Table XIV shows the number of common vulnerabilities for each pair of OS release (pairs with zero values are not displayed). The first observation is that there are many releases within this set of four OSs that appear to be free of common flaws. Second, these shared bugs occur more often between releases of the same OS. This is anticipated because more code is reused within the same OS. Additionally, one can notice that releases of the same OS typically have less shared vulnerabilities when comparing older and newer versions. This is particularly evident for the OpenBSD and Debian releases. This result is quite promising because it supports our thesis that one should be able to explore diversity across releases, as way to increase the number of available candidates for the construction of the diverse OS sets.
We can also look with more detail at the vulnerabilities that arise in larger sets of OS releases. To understand the impact of these vulnerabilities, we will resort to the classification of vulnerabilities by the CVSS metrics [55] . These metrics indicate how difficult is to exploit a flaw and what is the impact of the attack:
Access Complexity from Low, 'Specialized access conditions or extenuating circumstances do not exist', to High, 'Specialized access conditions exist'. Availability Impact from None, 'There is no impact to the availability of the system', to Complete, 'There is a total shutdown of the affected resource; The attacker can render the resource completely unavailable'. Confidentiality Impact from None, 'There is no impact to the confidentiality of the system', to
Complete, 'There is total information disclosure, resulting in all system files being revealed; The attacker is able to read all of the system's data (memory, files, etc.)'. Integrity Impact from None, 'There is no impact to the integrity of the system', to Complete, 'There is a total compromise of system integrity; There is a complete loss of system protection, resulting in the entire system being compromised; The attacker is able to modify any files on the target system'. Table XV presents the vulnerabilities that affected three or more OS releases with their respective CVSS metrics. It is reasonable to assume that vulnerabilities with low Access Complexity and complete Impact are the most critical, because they are easy to exploit and they severely affect one or more security attributes. Also relevant are the vulnerabilities with low or medium Access Complexity and that have complete Impact on at least one security attribute or partial Impact on all attributes. The vulnerabilities in Table XV that 
2-diverse sets.
To reduce the development and maintenance costs of an intrusion tolerant system, it is reasonable to investigate solutions that attempt to decrease the number of distinct OSs but still ensure a high level of security. Here, it makes sense to consider an approach that offers diversity with only two OSs, while still exploiting the diversity available within the OS releases. In the extreme case, one can select OSs from the same family, for instance, to simplify system management.
To study this sort of solution, we looked at the vulnerabilities that appeared in several versions of Debian and Red Hat (all released after 2000). In total, seven Debian and ten Red Hat releases were considered, which gives a total of 136 combinations. Table XVI Again, we can observe that there are few high impact vulnerabilities that cross many versions of the same OS. These results demonstrate that with a careful selection of the Debian and Red Hat releases, it is possible to avoid most of the common vulnerabilities, and apparently, it becomes viable to build an intrusion-tolerant replicated system on the basis of only two OSs. 
Limitations of data sources and its implications on the study
The numbers we have presented are intriguing and point to a potential for serious security gains from assembling an intrusion-tolerant system using different OSs, but they are not definitive evidence. Even though the NVD is arguably the most complete and referenced database for security vulnerabilities and it is regularly updated with contributions from several sources, there are some uncertainties that remain about the data, which limit the claims we can make about the benefits of diversity to increase security. Ozment [16] points out some problems with the NVD (chronological inconsistency, inclusion, separation of events, and documentation); for our purposes, the first two and the last one are the most relevant. 'Chronological inconsistency' means that the NVD data have inherent inaccuracies about the dates when vulnerabilities were discovered and when the vulnerable code was released, which not only complicates reasoning about the lifetime of vulnerabilities but also affects the versions that are vulnerable (for instance, sometimes obsolete versions of a product are vulnerable but are not listed in the NVD as such). 'Inclusion' refers to the fact that not all vulnerabilities are included in the NVD, only those with a CVE number; as CVE and NVD have gained traction, this has become less of an issue. Finally, there is little documentation about the NVD, and in the past, the meaning of some fields has occasionally changed without prior notice, which might make comparisons less meaningful. In what follows, we will discuss some other limitations and the implications that they have on the claims we can make about the security benefits of OS diversity:
1. We have looked at the vulnerabilities that are common across the different OSs rather than examining the source code and comparing the similarity/shared code that exists across different OSs. Implication: We accept that there may be other ways in which one can check the level of similarity or conversely diversity between different software systems, one of which is to look at the source code level. We did not take this approach for two main reasons: lack of access to the source code for closed-development systems (such as Microsoft) and also because the level of similarity (or diversity) of the code base may not necessarily tell us how many vulnerabilities the systems have in common. For this reasons, we chose to study the vulnerability data directly, although studying the code bases (where available) would be a good extension of this study. 2. The NVD does not provide 'reproducible scripts' or exploits -probably wisely -which would allow one to check whether the vulnerability can be exploited. From our past experience of working with nonsecurity-related bugs [30] , a bug report usually contains a script that reproduces the failure that the reporter has observed. Relying solely on the data available in the NVD, it is not possible to confirm that a reported vulnerability is actually exploitable. Implication: The lack of exploitability information makes it harder to adequately assess the risk posed by a vulnerability. Caution forces us to consider that all vulnerabilities are exploitable and must be re-mediated in due time, a strategy that has obvious implications both in terms of cost and in terms of complexity of management. 3. When a vulnerability is reported for more than one OS, it is not clear whether the reporter has checked that it has been confirmed to exist in the OSs, or it is just an indication that the vulnerability may exist in each of the OSs listed. Implication: The implications of the previous item apply here as well. Additionally, we have the implication that we cannot claim with certainty whether our estimates of the benefits of diversity, given earlier in the paper, are conservative or optimistic. If a vulnerability has been reported for OSs A and B but in fact only exists in A, then our estimates are conservative. On the other hand, if the vulnerability has been reported for OSs A and B only, but in fact it exists additionally in OSs C and D, then our estimates are optimistic. 4. Although more than 70 organizations (including many important OS vendors) use CVE to identify vulnerabilities, it is not clear if all products are equally represented in the NVD. Another related issue is that the vulnerability reporting process is inherently biased, both in timing and in coverage, although not necessarily in an intentional manner. For instance, when a new class of vulnerabilities is disseminated, there is often a surge of new reports involving this class. Finally, not all targets are given the same attention by vulnerability researchers. Software with smaller user bases tends to attract less scrutiny than popular ones, and vulnerabilities with higher impact usually receive more attention. There is even the case where specific vendors are targeted for some reason, as when Oracle claimed their database was 'unbreakable' only to have several vulnerabilities disclosed within 24 h [64] and the rise in exploitation of Adobe software since 2009 [65] . Implication: With any analysis of bug or vulnerability reports from an open database, there is uncertainty about how many of the vulnerabilities are actually reported. This fraction is certainly less than 100%. If all vulnerabilities had the same probability of being reported, the ratio between our predicted vulnerability counts for A and B (v.A, B/ -those that affect both products A and B) and A or B (v.A/ or v.B/ -those that affect only one of the products) would still be the ratio v.A, B/=v.A/ or v.A, B/=v.B/, respectively. But, in fact, we do not know whether the vulnerabilities of some OS are less likely to be reported in NVD than others (or conversely). It is not clear if the vulnerabilities of some OSs are reported to the vendors only (or some other vulnerability database) and do not appear in NVD. This again has implications about the claims that we can make about the benefits of diversity, as data entries may be missing, which overestimate the benefits of diversity for some products. 5. Our study includes all the vulnerabilities in the NVD whose CPE identifies one of the 11 OS families that we presented in sections 3 and 4. We also did a significant amount of manual analysis to ensure that ambiguous identifications of OSs could be resolved. However, it should be noted that if OS vulnerabilities have been listed in the NVD under different guises (e.g., by specifying as the product name a kernel rather than an OS name), then these types of vulnerabilities are not included in our analysis. Implication: We do not know to what extent poor identification of OSs is prevalent in NVD entries. If it is, and if a large number of vulnerabilities for components that are shared by multiple families of OSs (such as kernels) are reported directly under a specific product name rather than an OS name, then our estimates of common vulnerabilities presented in this study would likely be optimistic. 6. To calculate the inter-reporting times in our analysis in Section 5.2.3, we have used the report times used in NVD entries. We also cross-checked where possible these dates with another database, namely, OSVDB [56] . However, we found some limitations in the OSVDB data. Nearly 70% of the vulnerabilities have incomplete data; for example, solution date is null or is dated as January 01, 1970. Implication: The inter-reporting times should be treated with caution, as dates in which vulnerabilities are reported vary depending on the policy and agreements that databases may have with vendors rather than the actual date in which the knowledge of the vulnerability became public.
Decisions about deploying diversity
We have underscored that these results are only prima facie evidence for the usefulness of diversity. On average, we would expect our estimates to be conservative as we analyzed aggregated vulnerabilities across releases: common vulnerabilities could be much smaller in a 'specific set' of diverse OS releases. But, there are limitations on what can be claimed from the analysis of the NVD data alone without further manual analysis (other than what we have done, e.g., developing/finding and running exploit scripts on every OS for each vulnerability). A better analysis would be obtained if the NVD vulnerability reports were combined with the exploit reports (including exploit counts) and even better if they also had indications about the users' usage profile. However, vendors are often wary of sharing such detailed dependability and security information with their customers. There are partial exploit reports available from other sites (e.g., [57] ), but they are incomplete and a significant amount of manual analysis is required to match the vulnerabilities with exploits for each OS.
reporting to exploitation and patching). However, this task requires significant effort to reconcile the differences in the reporting formats of the databases, and the results are likely to remain imperfect because of missing data. 2. Further research on the extent to which we can reason about the benefits of diversity for security from using vulnerability data alone (especially if significant progress on the aforementioned item is not forthcoming). This work is currently under way. 3. Analyze the distributions of inter-reporting times and enrich them, where possible, with information about OS usage (say from download rates of these products). This might enable us to reason more accurately about how we can translate these inter-reporting times into vulnerability-free operating time. 4. Examine the diversity that exists between these systems (at least the open source ones) at the source code level. This would then enable analysis of the correlation between the metrics: amount of shared code and number of common vulnerabilities. One would expect the correlation to be strongly positive, but it is difficult to confirm this except with empirical studies.
